# Honeypot Detection

written by Mert SARICA | 3 September 2018 About a year ago, when I was planning my Hacker Hunt with a Deception System project, I was faced with the dilemma of whether to use a low-interaction or high-interaction honeypot system. When looking at the fundamental difference between them, we can say that a low-interaction honeypot, which simulates a real system or service, is relatively easier to set up, manage, and secure. On the other hand, a high-interaction honeypot involves a real, live system, making its installation, management, and security more challenging due to isolation.

From a management perspective, the use of low-interaction honeypot systems may sound more practical. However, the main purpose of using honeypots is to attract and learn about the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by cyber attackers. In practice, it can be much more difficult for attackers to detect high-interaction honeypots. When I observed the behaviors of numerous cyber attackers who attempted to hack my honeypot system for six months, most of them did not perform specific checks to determine if the system was a trap. Therefore, you may not need to exert much effort to harden highinteraction local honeypot systems.

Indeed, when it comes to detecting low-interaction honeypot systems, attackers can often perform a simple scan using tools like Nmap. This is why it is crucial for individuals and organizations that use honeypots to make them appear undetectable before placing them alongside live systems. In some cases, even before cyber attackers, the National Cybersecurity Intervention Center (USOM) may contact the internet service provider regarding this system, citing its vulnerability. :)

### C:\Users\Mert>nmap

Starting	Nmap 7.12	2 ( https://r	nmap.org ) at 2017-07-12 19:00 Turkey Standard Time
mass_dns:	: warning	: Unable to d	determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled.
servers	withdr	ns-servers	
Nmap scar	n report f	for	
Host is u	up (0.017	s latency).	
Not shown	n: 990 cla	osed ports	
PORT	STATE	SERVICE	
21/tcp	open	ftp	
25/tcp	filtered	smtp	
42/tcp	open	nameserver	
135/tcp	open	msrpc	
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	5
1433/tcp	open	ms-sql-s	
1720/tcp	filtered	h323q931	
3306/tcp	open	mysql	
5060/tcp	open	sip	
5061/tcp	open	sip-tls	
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Starting	Nmap 7.12	2 ( https://r	nmap.org ) at 2017-07-12 19:00 Turkey Standard Time
			determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled.
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	n report		
		s latency).	
		osed ports	
PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSTON
21/tcp	open	ftp (	Dionaea honeypot ftpd
	filtered	smtp	
42/tcp	open	nameserver?	
End Participant and the second second	open	msrpc?	
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	Dionaea honeypot smbd
1433/tcp	open	ms-sql-s	Dionaea honeypot MS-SQL server
1720/tcp	filtered	h323q931	
3306/tcp	open	mysql	MySQL 5.0.54
5060/tcp	open	sip	(SIP end point; Status: 200 OK)
5061/tcp	open	ssl/sip	(SIP end point; Status: 200 OK)

Ulusal Siber Olaylara Müdahale Merkezi (USOM) üzerinden tespit edildiğine dair bildirimde bulunmuştur.

Ulusal Siber Olaylara Müdahale Merkezi (USOM) üzerinden 🛛 🤰 ip adresli bir sunucunuz üzerinde SMB servisi ile ilgili güvenlik zafiyeti


16.03.2017 - MS17-010 - CVE-2017-0143-0148 25.09.2010 - MS10-061 - CVE-2010-2729 08.09.2009 - MS09-001 - CVE-2009-3103 25.09.2008 - MS08-067 - CVE-2008-4250

Konu ile ilgili microsoft bülteninin adresi aşağıdaki gibidir.

https://technet.microsoft.com/tr-tr/library/security/ms08-067.aspx

Konu ile ilgili gerekli müdahaleleri gerçekleştirdikten sonra bilgi vermenizi rica ederiz.

When it comes to honeypot systems, many people think of Dionaea. As seen in the screenshot above, Dionaea can be easily detected by Nmap when installed with the default settings. However, a quick search on the internet reveals numerous resources (#1, #2, #3) on how to make Dionaea appear undetectable. For example, by changing the "r.VersionToken.TokenType" parameter in the "/dionaea/mssql/mssql.py" file from 0x00 to 0x01, which simulates the MSSQL service, Nmap can no longer detect Dionaea running on port 1433. Since Dionaea simulates vulnerable services (low interaction), making it appear undetectable based on the information found in these resources can make it quite easy to identify Dionaea from the perspective of a cyber attacker. This sparked my interest in researching how easy it actually is to detect an "undetectable" Dionaea.



To avoid the hassle of setting up Dionaea, I opted to install T-Pot, a honeypot virtual system developed by Deutsche Telekom that includes numerous honeypot systems, including Dionaea. Considering that a small honeypot system like Dionaea may not fully simulate the MSSQL service (TDS protocol), I decided to start with port 1433.

## System Placement

Make sure your system is reachable through the internet. Otherwise it will not capture any attacks, other than the ones from your hostile internal network! We recommend you put it in an unfiltered zone, where all TCP and UDP traffic is forwarded to T-Pot's network interface.

If you are behind a NAT gateway (e.g. home router), here is a list of ports that should be forwarded to T-Pot.

Honeypot	Transport	Forwarded ports
conpot	TCP	1025, 50100
cowrie	TCP	22, 23
dionaea	TCP	21, 42, 135, 443, 445, 1433, 1723, 1883, 1900, 3306, 5060, 5061, 8081, 11211
dionaea	UDP	69, 5060
elasticpot	TCP	9200
emobility	TCP	8080
glastopf	TCP	80
honeytrap	TCP	25, 110, 139, 3389, 4444, 4899, 5900, 21000

# ubuntu®

#### Installer boot menu

T-Pot 16	. 10	
Advanced	options	)
Help		

#### Press ENTER to boot or TAB to edit a menu entry

Removing NGINX default website. Waiting a few seconds to avoid interference with service messages. Please choose your install type and notice HW recommendation.

- [T] T-Pot Standard Installation Cowrie, Dionaea, Elasticpot, Glastopf, Honeytrap, Suricata & ELK 4 GB RAM (6-8 GB recommended) 64GB disk (128 GB SSD recommended)
- [H] Honeypots Only Installation
  Cowrie, Dionaea, ElasticPot, Glastopf & Honeytrap
  3 GB RAM (4–6 GB recommended)
  64 GB disk (64 GB SSD recommended)
- [I] Industrial - ConPot, eMobility, ELK & Suricata - 4 GB RAM (8 GB recommended) - 64 GB disk (128 GB SSD recommended)
- - 128 GB disk or larger (128 GB SSD or larger recommended)

Install Type:

C:\WINDO	WS\system	32\cmd.exe		- C	- ×
C:\Users\/	Mert>nm	ap 192.168.20	.128 -sV -p 21,42,135,443,445,1433,1723,1883,1900,3306,5060,5061,8081,11211		
Starting	Iman 7	12 ( https://	nmap.org ) at 2017-09-15 14:39 Turkey Standard Time		
0			determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled. Try usingsystem-dns or	specify	valio
		dns-servers		specify	Valla
		for 192.168.	20.128		
		043s latency)			
PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION		
21/tcp	open	ftp	Synology DiskStation NAS ftpd		
42/tcp	open	nameserver?			
135/tcp	open	msrpc?			
143/tcp	open	ssl/http	nginx		
45/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	Dionaea honeypot smbd		
L433/tcp	open	ms-sql-s	Dionaea honeypot MS-SQL server		
	open	pptp	(Firmware: 1)		
L883/tcp		unknown			
L900/tcp					
	open	mysql	MySQL 5.7.16		
5060/tcp		sip?			
5061/tcp		<pre>ssl/sip-tls?</pre>			
3081/tcp		http	nginx		
11211/tcp		memcache	memcached 1.4.25 (PID 2809; uptime 10925 seconds; curr items: 380; total item	IS: 461;	byte
cached:				C .	
			e returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following	; finger	print
			ubmit.cgi?new-service :		
			9/15%Time=59BBBC01%P=i686-pc-windows-windows%		
		"@\x02/\0");			
		0C:29:CB:83:8			
bervice II	no: De	vice: storage	-1115C		

To establish communication between an MSSQL server and a client at the application level, the TDS (Tabular Data Stream) protocol must be used. The TDS protocol supports two types of login methods that have been available since the beginning. The first is login using a username and password, and the second is login using Windows authentication (NTLM). Normally, when attempting to log in with a username and password using the TDS protocol, the response from the MSSQL server should include the LOGINACK\_TOKEN (0xAD) token, and when attempting to log in with Windows authentication, it should include the SSPI TOKEN (0xED) token. However, Dionaea returns the same result for both types of requests. :)

Response from Microsoft SQL 2008 Server Express version to a Windows authentication request


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	T 🛓 🖬 📑 Q Q 0	R. 11		1 M 1011	
			1.2.000 1.200		Expression.
Time Source		Protocol	Length Info		
21 23.354776 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.128		106 TDS7 pre-login message		
22 23.355301 192.168.116.128		TDS	91 Response		
23 23.355392 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.128		288 TD57 login 196 Response		
24 23.356476 192.168.116.128 37 30.491326 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.1 192.168.116.128	TDS	196 Kesponse 106 TDS7 pre-login message		
38 30.491568 192.168.116.128		TDS	91 Response		
39 30.496005 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.128		312 TDS7 login, NTLMSSP NEGOTIATE		
40 30.496504 192.168.116.128		TDS	303 Response[Malformed Packet]		
41 30.496733 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.128	TDS	268 TD57 login[Malformed Packet]		
42 30.497590 192.168.116.128	192.168.116.1	TDS	336 Response		
151 109.454335 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.134	TDS	106 TDS7 pre-login message		
153 109.526371 192.168.116.134		TDS	97 Response		
154 109.526482 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.134		288 TD57 login		
156 109.552917 192.168.116.134		TDS	128 Response[Malformed Packet]		
221 172.673601 192.168.116.1 223 172.683224 192.168.116.134	192.168.116.134		106 TDS7 pre-login message 97 Response		
223 172.683224 192.168.116.134 224 172.687912 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.1 192.168.116.134		97 Response 312 TDS7 login, NTLMSSP NEGOTIATE		
224 1/2.68/912 192.168.116.1 225 172.697530 192.168.116.134		TDS	128 Response[Malformed Packet]		
bular Data Stream Type: Response (4) Status: 0x01					
Type: Response (4) Status: 0:00 1 = End of message: True 0. = Eurone this event: F 0. = Event notification: 1 0 = Reset connection keep Length: 249 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Mindow: 0 Token - SSP	False Ise	False			
Type: Response (4) Status: 0001 	False Ise	False			


### Response from Dionaea to a Windows authentication request

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Time Source	Destination Protocol	Length Info	
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22 23.355301 192.168.116.128	192.168.116.1 TDS	91 Response	
23 23.355392 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.128 TDS	288 TDS7 login	
24 23.356476 192.168.116.128	192.168.116.1 TD5	196 Response	
37 30.491326 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.128 TD5	106 TDS7 pre-login message	
38 30.491568 192.168.116.128	192.168.116.1 TD5	91 Response	
39 30.496005 192.168.116.1 40 30.496504 192.168.116.128	192.168.116.128 TDS 192.168.116.1 TDS	312 TDS7 login, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE 303 Response[Malformed Packet]	
40 30.496504 192.168.116.128	192.168.116.1 TDS 192.168.116.128 TDS	268 TD57 login[Malformed Packet]	
42 30.497590 192.168.116.128	192.168.116.1 TD5	336 Response	
51 109.454335 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.134 TDS	106 TDS7 pre-login message	
53 109.526371 192.168.116.134	192.168.116.1 TDS	97 Response	
54 109.526482 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.134 TDS	288 TD57 login	
56 109.552917 192.168.116.134	192.168.116.1 TDS	128 Response[Malformed Packet]	
21 172.673601 192.168.116.1	192.168.116.134 TD5	106 TD57 pre-login message	
23 172.683224 192.168.116.134	192.168.116.1 TDS	97 Response	
24 172.687912 192.168.116.1 25 172.697530 192.168.116.134	192.168.116.134 TDS 192.168.116.1 TDS	312 TDS7 login, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE 128 Response[Malformed Packet]	
smission Control Protocol, Src Port: lar Data Stream rpe: Response (4) catus: 0x01 1 = End of message: True	100, 01, 10, 1, 4000, 241, 4		
0. = Ignore this event: Fals 0 = Event notification: Fals 0 = Reset connection: False	lse e		
0 = Reset connection keepin ength: 74	ig transaction state: False		
hannel: 0			
scket Number: 0			
indow: 0			
indow: 0 ken - LoginAck Token length: 54			
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indow: 0 ken - LoginAck Token length: 54 Interface: 1 TDS version: 0x04020000 Server name: Microsoft SQL Server			
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Interface: 1 TDS version: 0x04020000 Server name: Nicrosoft SQL Server Server Version: 9.0.5.119 oken - Done Status flags: 0x0000			

In such a situation, I quickly prepared a simple tool named

"dionaea\_detector.py" using the pymssql library in Python, which can detect this difference. With this tool, I was able to identify the Dionaea honeypot system, which Nmap couldn't detect, through a simple check. By doing this, I learned how easily malicious individuals can practically detect it.





Exactly, before using a honeypot system, it is important to thoroughly evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of high and low interaction honeypots. Choosing the one that is difficult to detect by cyber attackers or making modifications to existing systems to make it more challenging can be beneficial for you or your organization. By considering these factors and implementing the appropriate measures, you can enhance your security and gain valuable insights into the tactics and techniques used by malicious actors.

Hope to see you in the following articles.

Note: Although the screenshots belong to T-Pot version 16.10, it has been confirmed that the dionaea\_detector.py tool can successfully detect Dionaea in the latest version of T-Pot, which is version 17.10 sürümü.